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ABSTRACT
This study outlines the changes which occur in Swiss cantonal 
budgets between 1967 and 1977. These changes are computed as an 
index of demonstrated budgetary flexibility, DBF, representing 
this investigation’s dependent variable. Five explanatory variables, 
drawn from previous studies of Japanese prefectures and West German 
municipalities, are tested against the dependent variable. The 
explanatory variables are environmental complexity, fiscal autonomy, 
environmental dynamism, interparty competition and local resource 
availability. A sixth variable, direct democracy, was also tested 
because three of twenty-five cantons are governed by direct democracy.
This analysis found that population size as a measure of 
environmental complexity, represents the most powerful explanatory 
variable defining variations in demonstrated budgetary flexibility. 
Fiscal autonomy and interparty competition are the second and third 
most relevant explanatory variables.
The behavior of Swiss cantons more closely approximates 
Japanese prefectures than West German municipalities. Both 
Switzerland and Japan have concepts of ’’consensus” which affect the 
decisionmaking process. The Japanese call their "consensus" 
baransu, and the Swiss label theirs, consociationality. Since it 
appears that baransu influenced decisionmakers in Japan, this Swiss 
analysis focuses on the definition and relevance of consociationalism 
to interparty competition. Further, the three cantons with direct 
democracy were tested against DBF and found to be statistically 
reliable.
This study concludes that incrementalist assumptions are 
more applicable to some Swiss cantons' behavior than others.
Budgetary stability is determined by a combination of environmental 
complexity, fiscal autonomy and politics.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
ON POLITICAL ECONOMY
Budgets are a reflection of a government's response to the 
questions of political economy: who gets what, from whom and for
what purposes. In answering these questions economic theory requires 
governments to set budget priorities rationally. Democratic economic 
theory further requires that the priorities reflect citizens' needs. 
However, incremental theory suggests that budgetary priorities are 
rather inflexible over time. This inflexibility appears as an 
unchanging budget or produces inflexible budgetary priorities.
Three explanations exist for such stability.
First, the budget could mirror the fact that a government is 
totally responsive to citizens’ changing needs which remain largely 
unchanged from year to year. Second, the government could be unre­
sponsive to citizens' changing needs, therefore making stability in 
the budget a reflection of a government's disregard for these needs. 
Third, it might be that the government's budgetary responses are 
restricted to reallocation within departments. Resource scarcity 
limits both the allocation and reallocation of funds.
If either of the last two conclusions is applicable, then the 
transfer of funds in response to changing social needs is impeded. 
Unwanted or unnecessary programs will continue while new or urgently
1
needed programs go uninitiated. The budget stability represented in 
these situations is counterproductive. It could signify the 
economically inefficient and politically undemocratic use of scarce 
resources. Therefore, the controversy over whether budget priorities 
are set incrementally or not is a relevant question to anyone affected 
by budget allocations.
Most political scientists accept the view that incrementalism 
generally characterizes a government's formulation of its policies.^ 
Recently, however, two studies conducted on West German municipalities 
and Japanese prefectures have questioned this concept. My study of 
Switzerland and its budget is patterned after these two analyses.
Two issues, first addressed in the study of West German 
2
municipalities arise when discussing budgetary flexibility and its 
implications. First, how much do budget shares vary over time? Second, 
what factors affect the amount of budgetary variation? Both of these 
queries, answered in long and short-run analysis, represent the crux 
of the thesis.
In essence, this thesis has two purposes: to define DBF and
the variables which determine its variation and to analyze under what 
settings the variables affect DBF. The second goal is achieved by 
presenting four regression models, each composed of three or four 
of the five explanatory variables identified in the West German and 
Japanese studies. The conclusion includes a broad comparison between 
the demonstrated budgetary flexibility of the three studies.
Five factors were found to influence DBF and will be used as
2
explanatory variables for the Swiss study: environmental complexity,
fiscal autonomy, local resource availability, interparty competition/ 
direct democracy and environmental dynamism. Each is thoroughly 
explained in Chapter III, Research Methods.
Four hypotheses are presented for testing: 1) as environ­
mental complexity increases, demonstrated budgetary flexibility 
decreases; 2) as fiscal autonomy increases, DBF decreases; 3) as 
interparty competition increases, DBF decreases; and 4) as direct 
democracy exists, demonstrated budgetary flexibility increases. The 
four regression models in Chapter IV explain the conclusions of the 
hypotheses.
In conjunction with the questions on DBF and the factors 
influencing its variation, the issue of Swiss politics is raised. 
Switzerland is a confederation with both direct democracy and 
representative democracy. The question to be answered is does the 
type of democracy affect demonstrated budgetary flexibility? If so, 
how much and why? The regression models in Chapter IV address these 
issues.
The continuing debate over whether Switzerland is a consocia-
tional democracy or not is the final characteristic discussed in this
thesis. Because the concept of baransu or "evenhandedness11 influenced
the results of the Japanese study, I felt the question of con-
3
sociationality might have the same effect. A review of the litera­
ture on consociationality is found in Chapter II and sets up a frame­
work for answering the question of whether the type of democracy
3
affects DBF. It is interesting to note that the literature indicates 
that the question of whether Switzerland is a consociational democracy 
or not is unresolved. To me, the fascination of consociationalism 
springs from whether, within representative democracy, cantons' 
consociationalism makes a difference. The analysis in Chapter IV 
dealing with the interparty competition variable answers this question.
This analysis is organized into four chapters. Chapter II 
is a review of the literature concerning incrementalism and con- 
sociationality. It also includes a summary of the results of the 
Japanese prefectural study. Chapter III outlines and explains my 
research methodology and problems encountered with the data.
Chapter IV presents the explanation and analysis of my four regression 
models. Chapter V contains the study's conclusions and directions 
for future research.
4
CHAPTER II
REVIEW AND IMPLICATIONS OF INCREMENTAL THEORY,
JAPANESE DEMONSTRATED BUDGETARY FLEXIBILITY 
AND CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY
This chapter is divided into three sections, each reviewing 
relevant aspects of the literature on incrementalism, Japanese 
prefectural budgeting, and consociationalism. This review places 
Swiss budgetary flexibility within a proper framework. A more 
detailed comparison of Japanese and Swiss DBF appears in Chapter 
IV.
I
Incremental decisionmaking holds that major budgetary decisions 
are made within the executive branch, because the legislature does 
not have the time to make them. These decisionmakers are not elected 
and therefore are not as sensitive to public pressures as elected 
legislators. Regardless of legislators' beholdenness to the public, 
however, they rarely change an executive recommendation, partly 
because of the complexity of the budget and partly because of the 
balanced budget requirement for subnational governments. As one line 
item increases, another must decrease. This balancing act requires 
time and expertise.
Legislators do not have the time to make substantial recom­
mendations for budgetary changes. They lack financial expertise and
5
have inadequate staff support, placing them in the awkward position
of having to accept the executive's budget or research alternatives
on their own time and at their own expense. The task of legislators
then is confined to checking for outright mistakes or explaining why
funding is unavailable. Consequently, the executive's budget is
often left unchanged.
Since the executive branch is assigned the task of preparing
the budget, several sets of "simple allocation rules" facilitate the
process. For example, an executive administrator looks to historical
precedent in determining feasible expenditures for the upcoming
budget. Charles Lindblom states:
An administrator would rely heavily on the record of 
past experiences with small policy steps to predict 
the consequences of similar steps extended into the 
future.^-
John Crecine, in his book, Governmental Problem Solving: A
Computer Simulation of Municipal Budgeting, further supports the 
contention that executive branch administrators must rely on past 
histories and fragmented methods of analysis.^ Most budget requests 
or problems are too complex to be dealt with on a holistic level. 
Therefore, they are treated like lines in a telephone directory; 
each is examined one at a time. Defining subareas of budget requests 
facilitates information gathering and priority-setting.
Unlike the legislators, the executive administrators have 
knowledge, albeit limited, and staff expertise at their disposal.
They make policy choices rationally by applying marginal adjustments
6
to past successful policies to formulate current budgetary policies.
Choices based on these criteria (marginal adjustments) yield apparently
stable budgets because the most reliance is placed on the preceding
year's agreed upon budget. In some respects, by eliminating policy
choices, incremental budgeting alleviates pressure and focuses
attention on an increase for all. Thus, if increases are made on
a fixed-percentage, across-the-board basis, each unit from year to
year maintains its share of the budget pie.
An incremental model is simply defined as follows. The hth
government's chief finance officer takes as his initial expenditure
estimate for the ith administrative unit, for the total budget
resources, j, in year, k, the amount authorized for expenditure in
year, k-1. This is, EXP, . .. ,  ^ EXP, . .. .J 9 hijk-1 hxjk
Then each item is increased on a fixed-percentage, across-
the-board basis. This is a special kind of incremental model, one
in which shares remain absolutely stable. The procedure "satisfies"
the administrative unit’s spending demand by providing each with a
"fair share" of the revenue increment (REV,., - REV, .). Anhjk hjk-1
allocation of this type insures that each unit maintains its relative 
share of the budgetary pie.
To determine the budget in year, k, it is logical to examine 
expenditures in year, k-1. A budget was agreed upon in year, k-1, 
and therefore forms the best model for year, k's, budget. An across- 
the-board increase alleviates political pressures, especially those 
worked out and reflected in year, k-l's, budget. Incremental theory
suggests that this reliance on "fair shares" and historical precedent
leads to the conclusion that budget shares do not change at all or
not much from year to year. Aaron Wildavsky best sums up this idea:
Budgeting is incremental . . .  A budget is almost never 
actively reviewed as a whole a year after . . . Instead 
it is based on last year's budget with special attention 
given to a narrow range of increases and decreases . . .
Thus . . . those who make the budget are concerned with 
relatively small increments to an existing b a s e .6
This model of budgeting as incremental is widely believed as
valid and supported by John Crecine and Aaron Wildavsky.^ Accepting
this notion requires acceptance of public policy as also organized
incrementally, especially as the budget is a plan for public policy.
William L. Morrow points out that this idea is a logical continuation
of the preceding statement in light of the fact that the bureaucracy
which produces the public policy has "sunk so much into existing
programs that to start from scratch is too disruptive, wasteful
g
and impractical." Thus the executive branch and the bureaucracy
contribute to incrementalism being used as the appropriate budgetary
decisionmaking procedure. By using incrementalism, budget stability
is maintained.
Several criticisms have been levied against budgetary
incrementalism. Wildavsky states that incrementalism produces clear-
9
cut conclusions about budgetary priorities, but P. B. Natchez and 
Irving Bupp question this point. Both find budgeting to be an 
incremental process, however the unit of application is at fault.
That is, most budget analysts concentrate their efforts on depart­
ments as administrative units of analysis. This focus obscures the
8
TABLE 1
SIMPLE, STABLE-SHARE, RESOURCE ALLOCATION MODEL 
MEASURING DEMONSTRATED BUDGETARY FLEXIBILITY
1.
2 .
3.
4.
5.
hijk-L
EXP, . .. <-
| hi2 k
E'Sp, . ., = REV, .hijk
A
hjk
yes
E&P, . ..ihuk
EXP, ... + a, . . (REV .. 
hijk hij hjk
BShijk - (BXphijk fI A
BS, ... — BS, . .. hijk hijk
The source for this model was extracted from Robert Rickards’ 
doctoral dissertation, p. 83.
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process itself which has produced the public policy--i.e ., the budget. 
According to Natchez and Bupp, there must be a shift in emphasis 
from departments to programs.^ Efforts would be directed then toward 
weighing policy alternatives. Incrementalism’s effectiveness as a 
tool used to explain how conflicts are avoided would be hampered by 
this change.
My study of Switzerland focuses on the departments within 
cantons and is subject, therefore, to the Natchez and Bupp criticism. 
However, I do not think that this weakness has adversely affected 
my investigation. My examination covers allocation across and within 
cantons focusing on money given to and generated by cantons. But 
priority-setting goes on at departmental level when the comptroller 
considers the entire budget. Therefore, the same analysis conducted 
in smaller political units is conducted here too. The emphasis on 
programs rather than departments is unnecessary since both are 
included in the departmental analysis.
In conclusion, incremental explanations have been used to 
account for budgetary behavior observed by budgetary analysts. The 
incremental models are simple to use and popular in a number of
studies concerning budgeting in international organizations,1*' U.S.
12 13cities, and local school systems. They are further used to
evaluate government programs such as revenue sharing. The models
14rely on two tools: historical precedent and fragmentation. The
questions raised in this study include whether or not these tools are 
used in Swiss cantonal budgeting procedures. My research concentrates
10
on whether adjustments in budget shares occur on a fixed-across- 
the-board basis or not.
II
A number of time-series studies have discovered unstable
16
expenditure patterns for certain programs within certain agencies. 
The instability of the expenditures forces a questioning of the 
blanket application of incrementalism as characterizing budgetary 
patterns. Two studies conducted within the past ten years further 
erode the assumption that incremental theory is universally appli­
cable . ^
A 1980 investigation of West German budget priorities defined 
the differing extent to which incremental models are applicable 
even at the departmental level of analysis. The units of analysis 
were West German municipalities and the study concluded that "consi­
derable flexibility in setting spending priorities for departments
exists within single governments over time and across governments at
18a point in time." The above-mentioned variables are used to 
explain when or under what conditions the greatest deviations from 
an existing budget are likely to occur. Given these findings, then, 
it is important to test and retest the variables and note if they 
constitute an adequate explanation for budgetary behavior in other 
national, governmental, temporal contexts.
In 1982, a study of Japanese prefectural budgeting, patterned 
after the West German analysis, provided similar, though not as 
conclusive results. The Japanese study revealed that budgetary
11
flexibility is more likely to occur under the same circumstances,
drawing this same conclusion as the West German study. As one of my
hypotheses, I suggest that Swiss cantonal and Japanese prefectural
behavior will be comparable. Therefore, a detailed recapitulation
of the Japanese analysis follows in order to clarify the connection
between the two.
Japanese budgeting is characterized by the concept, baransu,
or "balance." Baransu is closely akin to the American notion of
"fair-share" budgeting as Aaron Wildavsky defines it: "A convergence
of expectations on roughly how much an administrative unit is to
19
receive in comparison to others." "Fair-share" budgeting is the
ideal type of decisionmaking strategy because, as noted in section one
of this chapter, the "fair-share" revenue increment allocated each
department is just sufficient for the unit to maintain its slice
of the budget pie. Therefore, baransu when defined as comparable
to "fair-share" budgeting, should also be the ideal decisionmaking
strategy for Japanese budgeting. Strict adherence to the baransu
concept should produce "budgetary priorities that are absolutely
20
inflexible over time." This does approximate real world behavior,
even though the Japanese seem predisposed to reach decisions on the
basis of consensus.
The Japanese analysis revealed that budgets change, but not
much over time and between prefectures. Three factors were found
to affect budget stability: local resource availability, environmen-
21tal complexity and interparty competition. Baransu is understood
12
as a concept covered under how to deal with the complexity of the
prefecture. Chie Nakane speaks of "democracy" in Japan to mean that:
Any decision should be made on the basis of a consensus 
which includes those located lower in the hierarchy 
. . . it should leave no one frustrated or dis­
satisfied . 22
This conceptual framework is related to consociationality, which
23
has been noted in Switzerland. Upon this similarity--consensus-- 
I will build a comparison between Japanese and Swiss budget-share 
priorities. Baransu and Nakane's definition of "democracy" approxi­
mate a consociational situation with regard to making policies. For 
example, major parties in both Japan and Switzerland are represented 
at the national level. Albeit, the Japanese have one dominant 
party, the Swiss have five major parties and all are represented.
But the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan has many factions, 
while the major Swiss parties comprise a power-sharing bloc. The 
bloc acts like one large party with factions, i.e., like the LDP.
In Japan, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) dominates the 
budgetary process. It has the expertise, manpower and time necessary 
to produce public policy. The Liberal Democratic Party penetrates 
the budgetary process through the Ministry of Finance; therefore, 
the MOF takes the LDP's role in fiscal decisionmaking seriously.
The party, alone, however, is insufficiently equipped to evaluate 
competing spending proposals. The budgetary process, then, is more 
or less controlled by the executive branch. And as with incremental 
theory, the Japanese MOF "satisfies" all units by granting each
13
administrative unit funding equal to its base year appropriation plus
an increase in spending authority approximating the overall budget's 
24growth rate. This method of fund distribution minimizes conflicts 
among factions of the LDP and produces a budget which is more 
readily acceptable to most units.
The conclusion then is that Japanese budget-setting priorities 
are incremental. The incremental model generally explains priority- 
setting at the departmental level quite well. However, there still 
is interprefectural variation in the model's utility. And in 
comparative analysis, West German municipalities exercised greater 
demonstrated budgetary flexibility than Japanese prefectures. One 
explanation of this behavior was the absence of the baransu concept 
in West Germany.
However, budget shares in Japanese prefectures were not 
always stable. And in those prefectures which indicated greater 
flexibility, certain qualities were present. Three variables 
accounted for DBF in both West Germany and Japan and each is explained 
below.
Local resource availability, indicated by taxes, was the most
powerful explanatory variable. It accounted for DBF both in Japan
and West Germany. For those prefectures which have few uncommitted
resources, there is less inclination to alter the budget because
there are no funds with which to undertake new programs. Therefore,
25
the budget priorities remain unchanged. Those prefectures with 
greater revenue generating capabilities are better able to cover
14
existing expenditures, and meet new demands, which are more likely 
to involve reallocation than is merely continuing present programs. 
Prefectures with higher levels of local resource availability demon­
strate a higher amount of budgetary flexibility.
The second most potent explanatory variable was environmental 
complexity, defined as the number of problems with which budgetary 
officials are faced. Population size was the indicator in the 
Japanese study. The more populous the prefecture, the more clients 
to be served. The more clients, the greater the variety of demands 
for goods and services. More demands required more agencies, depart­
ments, and programs to fulfill the citizens' needs. To meet the 
demands, each unit must compete for local or natural resources. 
Therefore, the more demands officials have to deal with, the greater 
complexity of the environment and thus the heavier the reliance on 
stable-share allocation procedures. There are more competitors for 
the same funds in large governments, but the time constraint is 
identical for both small and large governments. Environmental com­
plexity was negatively correlated with demonstrated budgetary 
flexibility. As population size increased, DBF decreased. "Apparently 
officials in more complex environments are less inclined to alter 
existing interdepartmental expenditure priorities 1^
Interparty competition was the third variable affecting 
demonstrated budgetary flexibility. The relationship between the two 
was weak but significant. As interparty competition increased, 
budgetary flexibility decreased. This finding was consistent with
15
the results of the West German data. The closer to a one-party,
noncompetitive environment, the more flexible the budget. Apparently,
political parties in both countries are reluctant to enter into
27formal coalitions. In Japan, the prefectures with less interparty 
competition tend to demonstrate a greater DBF. The more the LDP 
dominates, the more flexible the budget. The low interparty 
competition in West Germany is due perhaps in part to the fact that 
in a noncompetitive environment, one party can muster the majority 
needed in order to pass its desired legislation. Thus it is more 
amenable to change.
Several conclusions drawn from the Japanese study should 
appear in my Swiss study. First, both nations have budget processes 
affected in some form by the idea of consensus (baransu, con­
sociationalism) . Second, the same three variables--local resources 
availability, environmental complexity, interparty competition-- 
should influence DBF. Third, Swiss budgets should reflect a 
stability of the same nature as the Japanese pattern. I suspect 
Swiss contons are more comparable to Japanese prefectures because 
the units of analysis are homologous. Before analyzing the empirical 
data, however, it is important to examine some Swiss characteristics 
in more detail, especially the concept of consociationalism.
Ill
The third review in this chapter concerns consociationalism.
My purpose is to explain generally the concept and its possible 
application to Swiss federalism.
16
Switzerland is a confederation of twenty-five cantons,
twenty-two having representative democracy and three having direct
democracy. The federal level of government has a Federal Council
which is elected and seated by proportional representation. The
behavior of elites at the federal level has been studied more
28frequently than at the cantonal level. But general conclusions
drawn about behavior at the federal level probably can be applied
to the cantons. One such conclusion is the existence of con-
sociationalism.
Switzerland is considered to be the best model of politics 
29
of accommodation. There are potential disruptive divisions every­
where in the nation: French-speaking vs. German-speaking peoples;
ethnic Italians vs. ethnic Swiss Germans; Catholics vs. Protestants; 
urban vs. rural. Yet Switzerland functions amazingly well, avoiding 
the political upheaval, which usually characterize societies with 
strong cultural cleavages. The question is why is it so stable? 
Several answers present themselves.
First, the multitude of tensions actually makes for stability. 
There are so many cross-cutting tensions that cantonal alliances 
shift. The tendency is for the tensions or rifts to cancel each other 
out. The character of the Swiss people, themselves, plays a role in 
cancelling out these tensions. There appears to exist a traditional 
spirit of accommodation and compromise which has characterized 
Swiss politics for centuries. At the federal level, all Swiss parties 
from Communists to Christian Democrats are seated. At the cantonal
17
level, parties can be elected from any part of the spectrum. As a
matter of fact, the sheer number and range of parties accepted at
both levels could indicate the high tolerance for diversity the Swiss
have. Perhaps the Swiss system has succeeded so far because the
people have come to accept variety. The constant exposure to diverse
elements has tempered the Swiss spirit and focused the citizens'
attention on compromise. This explanation is no more operationaliz-
able than the elements of consociationalism, but it is useful in
depicting the character of the people the Swiss government serves.
Perhaps, Arend Lijphart's conclusion that Switzerland is consociational
could be partially supported by this idea.
Second, the Swiss tend to render government as impersonal as
possible. This impersonal attitude lessens tensions produced by
emotions. Therefore, elite politics reflectsless conflict than mass
politics. Incrementalism is one way to dampen conflicts among 
30
elites. As the budgetary process relies more heavily on incremental
assumptions, conflict and tension is reduced. Perhaps the Swiss
system reflects these incremental assumptions.
Debate over the topic has led to several definitions of
consociationalism, cleavages, subcultural segmentation and majority 
31rule. The major problem lies in the fact that these definitions 
are difficult to operationalize. For example, Arend Lijphart argues 
that Switzerland is a consociational democracy based on several 
evident societal cleavages: a) Swiss linguistic diversity;
b) ethnic diversity; c) religious segmentation; and d) class
18
32cleavages. Brian Barry, Jurg Steiner, Robert H. Dorff and D. E. 
Bohn respond that these cleavages do not really define Switzerland 
as a consocietional democracy, because they are cross-cut; that is, 
cleavages are not definitively and statistically defined. Shifting 
segmentations place Swiss citizens in several groups at once, 
thereby diluting the rigidity of dividing lines. Because the
rigidity does not exist, the desire for compromise or consensus is
33overrated.
Third, the decisionmaking pattern of Swiss elites helps 
explain Switzerland's stability. The pattern is determined by and 
affects the level of tension among the groups. Jurg Steiner and 
Robert H. Dorff note two types of decisionmaking processes: the
competitive pattern of conflict management, represented by majority 
rule; and the noncompetitive, cartelized pluralist pattern, which
functions under the device of amicabilis compositio or amicable
34
agreement. It is this second decisionmaking process which seems
to apply to Swiss federal and cantonal governments. The emphasis
on consensus of the group(s) is the same as Japanese baransu,
Nakane's concept of "democracy" and seems to be related to the
"impersonal" character of Swiss government.
Consociationalism has been identified at the federal level,
35in both the Federal Council and Council of States. For consocia­
tionalism to succeed, however, there are four prerequisites which 
must be present. Primarily, the elites must have the ability to 
accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the subcultures
19
(societal diversions). Second, the elites, therefore, must have the 
ability to transcend the cleavages and to join in a common effort 
with the elites of rival subcultures. This ability depends on the 
elites' commitment to the maintenance of the system. Third, the 
elites must strive to improve the cohesion and stability of the 
system. This requires low tension levels. This could be 
accommodated if resource reallocation within the budget had no 
political implications, for example. Fourth, the underlying 
assumption accepted by all the elites is that they understand the 
dangers and consequences of political fragmentation. If all four of 
these conditions are fulfilled, then a consociational decisionmaking 
process exists. The important question is, if it exists in Switzerland, 
then one can expect results similar to the Japanese study. The 
prerequisites for consociationalism in Switzerland appear, supporting 
the contention that Swiss DBF and Japanese DBF are influenced by the 
notion of consensus. The results in Chapter IV explain the empirical 
evidence confirming these conclusions.
In closing, consociationalism in Switzerland could be related 
to the fact that Switzerland is a confederation. The importance and 
relevance of federalism to my study is that the existence of 
federalism is usually reflected in finance. J. Murray Luck best 
sums it up:
The test of the reality of a federation is usually in 
finance. In this respect, Swiss federalism is quite 
real. . . The cantons >. . . have substantial financial 
resources of their own. . . (They) resort to income tax, 
wealth tax, fees, loans, etc. There is no federal ceiling 
on the amounts or sources of cantonal income.^6
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In light of this cantonal autonomy, the fact that the confederation
of Switzerland functions smoothly lends credence to the argument
37
that consensus and common will govern the Swiss political system.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The most difficult part of the thesis involved the organiza­
tion of the data. The research design presents the questions out­
lined in the introduction: how much do budget shares vary over time,
across cantons and what factors affect demonstrated budgetary
flexibility? In answering these questions, four hypotheses were 
38formulated. The hypotheses were tested with data drawn from the
Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz for years 1967 to 1977.
Information on cantonal population size, cantonal taxes and tax
rates, interparty competition and general wealth was recorded and
explanatory variables were singled out for use in regression models.
The years 1967 to 1977 were chosen because of consistency in
departmental categories. Some departments were deleted or added to
others, but manipulation of the data successfully reduced the number
of budget divisions to a common basis of fourteen categories.
Discussion of this weakness follows later in this chapter.
A second reason for choosing these years and Swiss cantons
as units of analysis is the diversity reflected in the budget over
this period of time. Tables 2 and 3 represent the budget categories
for all cantons. The figures approximately equal the total general
39budget expenditure. As is seen in the charts, there is much
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TABLE 2
DIVERSITY IN SWISS BUDGET SHARES ACROSS 
CANTONS FOR YEARS, 1967-1977
Category Maximum.
General Administration 8.58
Justice/Law 8.58
Military Affairs/
Defense 5.66
Education 33.29
Religion 1.73
Public Health 26.71
Land Management 1.22
Roads and Construction 71.12
Social Planning 11.47
Traffic/Energy 3.98
Social Affairs 25.09
Environmental and
Social Welfare 6.38
Financial Expense 18.32
Budget Interest 6.335
Minimum Mean S. D .
3.02 5.49 1.48
2.64 6.12 1.64
1.25 3.12 1.45
6.91 20.28 7.66
0 .40 .57
1.05 12.28 7.34
.001 .223 .57
6.15 23.08 14.51
1.91 7.15 3.45
.006 1.02 1.15
.29 8.50 6.19
1.31 3.37 1.80
.76 3.24 3.58
1.90 4.08 1.41
-25 cases in the long-run analysis: 25 cantons.
-Represents total budget.
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TABLE 3
DIVERSITY IN SWISS BUDGET SHARES ACROSS 
CANTONS FOR YEARS, 1967-1977
Category_________________ Maximum____Minimum______ Mean_______ S . D .
General Administration 9.9
Justice/Law 11.7
Military Affairs/
Defense 12.1
Education 37.0
Religion 2.2
Public Health 36.8
Land Management 8.0
Roads and Construction 76.0
Social Planning 18.1
Traf f ic/Energy 5.6
Social Affairs 35.5
Environmental and
Social Welfare 13.9
Financial Expense 22.2
Budget Interest 8.4
2.0 5.28 1.48
.6 6.13 1.64
.8 3.12 1.45
4.3 20.28 7.66
0 .40 .57
.3 12.22 7.34
0 .22 .57
3.5 23.07 14.5
.19 7.15 4.37
0 1.02 1.15
.1 8.50 6.19
0 3.37 2.47
.38 3.25 3.58
1.3 4.08 1.41
-275 observations for short-run analysis: 25 cantons over 11
years = 25 x 11 = 275.
-Represents total budget.
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diversity in both the short- and long-run analysis.
Switzerland as a case study was chosen because of a personal
interest in the country, its laws, politics and behavior. Further,
similarities and differences from the two preceding studies of West
Germany and Japan make their comparison interesting. Switzerland
is a small, natural resource poor, but extremely affluent, hetero-
40geneous country. There are three ethnic groups, four linguistic
41 42divisions, and several political parties. Four official languages
exist, although German is by far the most widely spoken.
The political system is fragmented in that there are a
myriad of political parties, each entitled to representation.
Elections are held either every four, five, or six years, and
officials are seated by proportional representation.
Heterogeneity, geography and politics differentiate
Switzerland from Japan and West Germany. The concept of baransu
in Japan resembles the idea of consociationality in Switzerland.
In both, consensus is the key to the government's smooth functioning.
Second, both cantons and prefectures are comparable units of
analysis in size and administrative organization. Switzerland is
a "loose" federal grouping of cantons--i.e ., a confederation. Japan
is more tightly centralized and is not a federal system. However,
the method of decisionmaking, similar in both units, compensates
for the difference in national governments. The West German system
is federal, but the municipalities reflect more DBF than either
Japanese prefectures or Swiss cantons. Further, the size and
25
organization of municipal governments are different in Germany.
It is more decentralized than the other two.
Japan has one large party, the Liberal Democratic Party, 
which controls both the national and prefectural levels of govern­
ment, making minority party representation and impact difficult.
The Swiss political system does not have one large party, but 
rather parties acting in consensus as a "bloc" and operating as a 
large party. The "bloc" is a manifestation of consociationality 
at work in Switzerland. Because the bloc operates as one large 
party with factions, budget-setting priorities should be determined 
as they are in Japan. That is, the LDP in Japan has great impact on 
the budgetary process by working through the government, which 
operates under baransu. Therefore, each department is granted an 
increment over last year's budget, thereby"satisficing" each unit. 
The factions within the LDP are tempered by the fact that all areas 
seem to receive "equal" treatment in budget allocation. Swiss 
behavior should approximate Japanese results.
The closer the bloc is in consensus, the more it resembles 
movement toward a one party system. The closer to a one party 
system, the more flexible the budget. Thus Japanese and Swiss 
budget behavior should be similar. If the results are the same, 
then consocietionalism, like baransu, has an effect on DBF.
Interest in Switzerland led me to pose some of the above­
listed questions. Before defining the explanatory variables used 
to answer these questions, an explanation of demonstrated budgetary 
flexibility is required.
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Demonstrated budgetary flexibility is a concept describing
deviations from routine budgetary decisionmaking. This indicator
determines budget fluctuations from year to year and between
cantons. In order to calculate DBF, the budget is divided into
categories which are consistent over a period of time. These
categories reflect administrative structure of cantonal govern- 
43ments. In several instances the categories equal combinations of 
smaller categories reduced to one division. The problems and effects 
this had will be discussed later in this chapter.
The steps to determine DBF are:
1. divide each share of the budget within each category by 
the total budget which equals the percentage of the total budget this 
share is;
2. subtract the base year category from previous year's 
category;
3. take the absolute value of the figure in step 2 in order 
to prevent double counting increases and decreases;
4. sum the absolute value differences (from step 3) = DBF. 
Table 4 illustrates this procedure.
In the Swiss case, there are a total of 275 observations of 
budget shares, but 250 observations for budget differences because 
no differences are computed for beginning year, 1967. The DBF, 
then, is calculated to define the budget-setting priorities over 
time and at a point in time.
Regressions and correlation analyses were performed for 
comparative purposes, keeping in mind the impact of a slightly less
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TABLE 4
SIMPLE, STABLE-SHARE, RESOURCE ALLOCATION MODEL 
MEASURING DEMONSTRATED BUDGETARY FLEXIBILITY
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
EXPhij k-L
EXP,... <-
I hijk
5§P . . =hijk REV, .hjk
yes
>YA
E&> . .^  hij k
Exphijk + ahij (REVhjk
BShijk ■ (EXPhijk /I A
BS, . - BS, .hijk hijk
REVhjk-L)
The source for this model was extracted from Robert Rickards’ 
doctoral dissertation, p. 83.
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than sufficient, n, in the long-run analysis. The impact of this 
inherent weakness is dealt with later in this chapter.
An indicator is available now to answer the questions of 
political economy. -The next step is to determine what factors
affect the flexibility of the budget as represented by DBF. In
44past studies, five factors were found to explain budgetary 
stability: fiscal autonomy, environmental complexity, environ­
mental dynamism, interparty competition, and local resource avail­
ability. These variables are used in my study to confirm and expand 
previous findings.
Each investigation of DBF has measured explanatory variables 
a bit differently. The Swiss variables were drawn from the 
Statistiches Jahrbuch der Schweiz and are defined below.
Fiscal autonomy represents the independence a canton 
exercises from federal funds. Theoretically, the more autonomous 
a canton--i.e ., the more independent of federal funds--the easier 
it is to shift budget priorities. Less funds are allocated to 
predetermined programs or departments. The cantons which generate 
the most local resources usually exercise the greatest autonomy 
because they rely less on federal monies for total budget opera­
tions .
In Switzerland, the federal government awards sums of money 
to each canton. The figure varies from .6 percent to 64 percent of 
the total receipts. The amount of money the canton receives, whether 
it is rich or poor, determines how funds are reallocated, whether
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new programs are feasible or whether the budget remains unchanged.
This variable was computed two different ways because the level of 
federal contributions was only available for two of my eleven 
years. Therefore, the variables calculating autonomy equalled the 
actual federal contribution and the ratio of federal to cantonal 
contribution. The ratio of contributions was chosen as the indicator 
of fiscal autonomy. This measure was picked both for its consistency 
and its lack of multi-colinearity problem. In all four regression 
models presented in Chapter IV, fiscal autonomy remained statistically 
significant and a useful explanatory of variation in demonstrated 
budgetary flexibility.
Environmental complexity is defined as the number of problems 
which a budgetary official must face. One possible measure is 
population size. Or, as in the Japanese study, the number of civil 
servants and budget size were used as the indicators. In 
Switzerland as in West Germany, the natural log of population 
represented the environmental complexity. When DBF was plotted 
against population a curvilinear relationship was found. In order 
to describe this relationship a natural log transformation of these 
data has been carried out.
Environmental dynamism is the third variable presented as a 
possible explanation of DBF variation. For Switzerland, a growth 
rate was computed by subtracting from the population in base year 
the previous year’s population. This number was then divided by 
the base year population. The natural log of this figure was taken
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to make it comparable to the environmental complexity variable.
Interparty competition is determined by a series of equations 
developed in the West German and Japanese studies. Party ,rblocsM 
were outlined in Switzerland by reading literature on the topic.
The blocs were summed, divided by the total number of representatives 
for each canton, and subtracted from 50 percent. The absolute 
value of this subtraction equals the interparty competition variable.
Five blocs were tested: a) the Christian Democrats, the
Radicals, the Liberals, the Socialists; b) the Swiss People's Party, 
the Christian Democrats, the Radicals and the Socialists; c) the 
Christian Democrats, the Radicals, the Liberals, the Swiss People's 
Party and the Socialists; d) the Christian Democrats, the Radicals 
and the Socialists; and e) the Socialists. Each party was represented 
somewhere in Switzerland, but the problem of direct democracy in 
three cantons meant that only twenty-two calculations for interparty 
competition could be made. Therefore, testing hypotheses related 
to direct democracy required the use of dummy variables. This use 
avoided confusion over the impact of direct democracy on the inter­
party competition variable. The dummy calculation yielded 275 
observations in the short-run as opposed to 220 cases for the inter­
party competition short-run.
The final variable used to explain demonstrated budgetary 
flexibility is local resource availability or wealth. Each cantonal 
government in Switzerland taxes various items or services within the 
canton--i.e., income, wealth, automobiles, inheritance. The data
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used as a measure of wealth was the deflated per capita tax on income 
and inheritance. This indicator covered as much of the economic 
value of the cantons as possible. If one measures a locality's 
stock of wealth and its income stream, its entire economic value 
has been assessed.
There were several problems with the data which led to 
consequences for the study or produced weaknesses. Throughout the 
period, 1967 to 1977, the most pressing problem was inconsistency 
with budget categories. As pointed out earlier, the divisions 
went from eighteen in 1967 to fourteen in 1977, with some fluctua­
tions in between. The categories were grouped together under new 
or old titles or else completely deleted, leaving no clue as to how 
the budget category funds were accounted for in subsequent budgets.
4*
Manipulations with the data included subtracting out two categories, 
and creating a new total. Nevertheless, some budget categories 
remained unchanged and those created by manipulation were meaningful 
and reflective of Swiss governmental structure.
In conjunction with the budget category inconsistency, the 
scope of the study was limited further by the fact that all data were 
drawn from one source, the Statistiches Jahrbuch der Schweiz. Any 
errors in recording, typing or data gathering could not be checked 
by me because I only used this source. However, there were no 
missing data and no glaring inconsistency from year to year noted in 
any of the information used. A certain amount of random error is 
expected and accounted for in this study.
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The explanatory variables themselves created some difficulties. 
Those variables which most influenced demonstrated budgetary flex­
ibility in post studies--wealth, environmental complexity, and 
interparty competition--were calculated differently. Different 
measures were drawn, identifying the same concepts as in the past.
These measures could affect BS and beta weights. For example, 
fiscal autonomy was calculated on the basis of data available for 
only two years, 1976 and 1977, then modified to fit all 275 observa­
tions. The preferred method of calculating fiscal autonomy would be 
to subtract the federal contributions to cantons from total cantonal 
receipts to determine how much cantonal income is locally generated. 
However, the variable fiscal autonomy was highly correlated with the 
limited variable of federal contributions indicating that both were 
explaining the same thing more or less.
The question of consociationality presented problems because
48the concept has never been measured quantitatively. Several studies 
battle over the criteria for determining consociationality, but no 
decision is reached on the concept's applicability to Switzerland.
The common point of agreement isthat some consensus does exist at 
the federal government levels of decisionmaking; but no mention of 
cantonal behavior is ever made. The limited available literature 
caused some confusion in analysis because of a lack of a definitive 
response to consociationality. This framework was used in analyzing 
the regression and correlation models of demonstrated budgetary 
flexibility, interparty competition and direct democracy.
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The existence of direct democracy in the cantons of
Obwalden, Appenzell-ihr, and Appenzell-ahr necessitated the
formulation of a dummy variable. These cantons conduct their
affairs through a town meeting type of decision process. The
small size of the cantons, according to Mr. Alain Jacot of the Swiss
Embassy, is the main reason for this type of decisionmaking. Again,
very little literature exists on the topic and most is reported
49with investigations of party-based oppositions. Perhaps the scope 
of my interpretation of direct democracy's impact is limited by this 
lack of information, but not seriously so.
The final weakness exists in the insufficient number of 
observations in the long-run analysis. In order to apply large 
group statistics, a minimum n of thirty is required. The models 
using the interparty competition variable have twenty-two 
observations and the models with direct democracy have twenty- 
five. This weakness has affected the statistical significance of 
the interparty competition variable in one of the m o d e l s . W h i l e  
twenty-five out of thirty is not seriously short of the n = 30 
criteria, twenty-two out of thirty might be seen as troublesome.
Despite these weaknesses, the study presents statistically 
reliable models to explain variation in DBF. Chapter IV identifies 
and explains these models.
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CHAPTER IV
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES ACCOUNTING FOR CANTONAL 
DEMONSTRATED BUDGETARY FLEXIBILITY
The Swiss study revealed three variables as useful in 
explaining intercantonal differences in DBF. These variables are: 
environmental complexity, fiscal autonomy and interparty competition/ 
direct democracy. Tables 5 and 6 present statistics indicative of 
the great diversity apparent in the explanatory variables.
Regressions models employing these variables are found in 
Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12. These models account for much of the 
intercantonal demonstrated budgetary flexibility and therefore 
are useful in defining budget-setting environments in which incre­
mental assumptions may not hold.
Of the three variables, environmental complexity offers the 
strongest explanation of DBF. As noted in Chapter III, the more 
complex the environment, the more decisions must be made on altering 
or setting budget priorities. Therefore, in order to cut down or 
simplify the environment, decisionmakers rely on several incremental 
assumptions: 1) allocation rules; 2) "satisficing"; and 3) historical
precedent. If this reasoning is correct, then environmental 
complexity should be negatively correlated with DBF. Table 7 supports 
this idea. Environmental complexity is negatively correlated (-.4875)
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TABLE 5
STATISTICS DESCRIBING THE SHORT-RUN EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES' VALUES FOR SWISS CANTONS
VARIABLE N MAXIMUM MINIMUM MEAN
Env. Comp.
(Nat. Log of Pop.)
275 9.51 4.86 7.28
Fiscal Autonomy 
(Ratio of Fed. 
contributions to 
cantonal contributions) 
(%)
275 6.49 06 .56
Inter-Party Competition 
(1507o-”7o Blog of 5 
major pties)
242 50.00 13.33 38.28
Direct Democracy 275 1.00 0 .12
36
STANDARD
DEVIATION
1.13
.90
10.04
.32
TABLE 6
STATISTICS DESCRIBING THE LONG-RUN EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES’ VALUES FOR SWISS CANTONS
VARIABLE N
STANDARD
MAXIMUM MINIMUM MEAN DEVIATION
Env. Complexity 
(Nat. Log of Pop.)
25 9.33 4.90 7.28 1.15
Fiscal Autonomy 
(Ratio of Fed. 
contributions to 
cantonal contributions) 
(%)
25 2.80 .07 56 . 63
Inter-Party Competition 
(| 50% - Bloc %|)
22 50.00 15.65 38.28 9.75
Direct Democracy 25 1.00 0 .12 .33
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TABLE 7
ZERO-ORDER CORRELATION OF VARIABLES 
N = 275
VARIABLES
DBF____________1.000
Env. -.4875
Comp . .0001 1.000
Fiscal -.0693 -.3741
Autonomy_______ .2746 .0001 1.000
Interparty -.0746 "-.1732 .3205
Competition_____.2705 .0069____ . 0001_______ 1.000
Direct .4313 -.5701 .0684 0.000
Democracy   .0001 .0001____ . 2583______  1.000
Env. Fiscal Interparty
DBF Comp. Autonomy Competition
c*> .05
1.000
Direct
Democracy
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with DBF. Further, Table 7 reveals that no multicolinarity problem 
exists with any of the variables which might affect conclusions drawn 
from the data.
The second explanatory variable is fiscal autonomy.
Represented as the ratio between the level of federal contributions 
to the level of cantonal contributions, this variable addresses the 
influence of cantonal independence in determining budget priorities. 
The less money a canton receives from the federal government, the 
more autonomous it is. The canton is able to allocate or reallocate 
funds more easily because less monies are precommitted. Given this 
logic and the method of calculating the variable, there should exist 
a negative relationship between DBF and fiscal autonomy. As the ratio 
of federal funds to cantonal funds increases, DBF should decrease. 
Table 7 supports this contention. The more autonomous a canton, 
the more flexible the budget-setting priorities (-.0693).
The most flexible canton over the 275 observations was 
Appenzell-ihr. This discovery should not be surprising because of 
the strength of the two explanatory variables defined so far. 
Appenzell-ihr is a small canton with a population of 13,000. All 
of its citizens are Catholic and Christian Democrats, making the 
area homogeneous. The canton roughly generates 31.74 percent^ of 
its monies and has a maximum DBF of 19.00. The flexibility is due 
in part to its small size, verifying the hypothesis that the less 
complex an environment is, the more flexible its budget. Secondly, 
the level of fiscal autonomy indicates that it is not overly dependent
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on the federal government for funds. Therefore, it has the capability 
of exercising its options to shift priorities because fewer funds 
are precommitted.
The third variable accounting for variation in DBF is
interparty competition. In the short-run analysis of interparty
competition, the voting "bloc" is composed of Social Democrats,
Christian Democrats, Radicals, Liberals and the Swiss People's
Party. Table 7 shows that an inverse relationship exists between
DBF and competition. Some conclusions can be drawn from this. In
highly competitive situations, political parties are more sensitive
52to marginal citizens1 needs. Studies assume that in order to win 
votes, the parties will opt for budget changes in favor of voters' 
preferences. By definition then, governments that change spending 
priorities demonstrate more DBF than do those that merely maintain 
existing ones. By looking at the correlations between DBF and 
interparty competition, one sees that governments with a politically 
competitive environment do not change budget priorities. Although 
the correlation is weak (-.0746), the relationship still exists. 
Apparently, the closer one moves to a one-party bloc, the more 
flexible the budget-setting priorities. The same results were found 
in the Japan and West German studies.
In the Japanese analysis, the more competitive situation-,__
yielded parties with a less stable majority. Therefore, DBF tended 
to be less because the lack of a stable majority prevented the forma­
tion of consensus within the legislature to alter the budget. In
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less competitive situations, one party holds a majority and thus 
is capable of mustering the necessary votes to change resource 
allocations.
The Swiss study supports this contention. Chapter III
explains that the bloc acts as one large party with many factions,
mirroring the image of the LDP in Japan. As the LDP dominated
Japanese politics, especially through the MOF, demonstrated budgetary
flexibility increased. The same holds true for Switzerland. The
bloc never maintains less than a 13 percent majority in cantonal
governments. It always has a margin of control, allowing it the
liberty of altering budget priorities. In those cantons with a
high interparty competition figure, DBF is high. The higher the
interparty competition variable, the closer to a one-party system.
53Certain American studies by V. 0. Key, Jr., Thomas Dye, 
and Glen T. Broach support the reasoning that in more highly 
competitive situations, political parties tend to be more responsive 
to voters1 needs. These studies assume that parties attain votes by 
promising to alter present expenditure patterns in the voters' favor. 
Governments that change spending priorities demonstrate more 
budgetary flexibility than those which maintain existing ones.
The three variables run in the short-run regression are 
shown in Table 9. This model is the only one with four variables 
in it because of the need to have a statistically reliable explana­
tion for DBF's variation. The fourth variable is local resource 
availability, whose format measure was taken from the studies of
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West Germany and Japan. In both of these, local resource avail­
ability was the major explanation for DBF. In the Swiss study, it 
does not enter the explanation except for this model. Local resource
availability was not used because of the multicolinarity problems
54it has with interparty competition. The higher the correlation, 
the more difficult it is to distinguish which variable is responsible 
for what effect. Therefore, it was not used. Further, this model 
explained 23.40 percent of the variation, the lowest of all models.
Table 9 confirms the explanatory capacity of each variable 
and verifies that environmental complexity is the most powerful 
explanation of DBF. Complexity accounts for 41 percent of the 
23.40 percent of the variation in DBF. While this variable is the 
most important for my study, the results are similar to those found 
in West Germany and Japan. Basically, the size of the unit of govern­
ment and the complexity of the environment determine a good portion 
of budget-setting priority policy.
A fourth political variable is analyzed in Switzerland: direct
democracy. Chapters II and III define the concept and where it 
exists in Switzerland. Table 10 indicates the regression results and 
Tables 7 and 8 present the correlation outcomes between DBF and direct 
democracy, in theory, direct democracy is citizen input through the 
institutions of the initiative and the referendum. Any minority 
group can gain recognition or input into public policy by instituting 
one of these tools. If it is true that governments respond to 
citizen needs, which citizens determine and convey through the direct
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TABLE 8
ZERO-ORDER CORRELATION OF VARIABLES 
N = 25
VARIABLES
DBF 1.000
Env. -.8000
Comp ._________ (.0001) 1.000
Fiscal .0986 -.5484
Autonomy______ (.6390) (.0045)____1.000
Interparty -.0291 -.1803 .4617
Competition (.8977) (.4219) (.0305)________ 1.000
Direct .7109 -.5703 .0998 0.000
Democracy (.0001) (.0029) (.6350) (1.000)
Env. Fiscal Interparty
DBF Comp. Autonomy Competition
°^= .05
1.000
Direct
Democracy
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TABLE 9
SHORT-RUN REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, 
DBF, AND THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES, ENVIRONMENTAL 
COMPLEXITY, FISCAL AUTONOMY, LOCAL RESOURCE 
AVAILABILITY AND INTERPARTY COMPETITION
N = 275 
VARIABLES
F Value = 16.416 
B
RSQR = .2340 
BETA STD. ERROR PROB. T
Environmental
Complexity
Fiscal
Autonomy
Local Resource 
Availability
Interparty
Competition*
-1.33
-0.90
- 0.01
-0.04
- .46
-.31
-.19
-.16
.19
.19
.01
.02
.0001
.0001
0102
.0306
*Only 242 OBS. 
•C = .05
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TABLE 10
SHORT-RUN REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, 
DBF, AND THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES, ENVIRONMENTAL 
COMPLEXITY, FISCAL AUTONOMY AND 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY
N = 275 F Value = 40.937 RSQR = .3330
VARIABLES ________________B BETA STD. ERROR PROB. T
Environmental
Complexity -1.39 -.49 .19 .0001
Fiscal
Autonomy -0.92 -.27 .19 .0001
Direct
Democracy 1.64 .16 .63 .0103
= .05
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democracy instruments, then one expects a positive relationship 
between direct democracy and DBF. As citizens change their minds, 
the government changes its policies, producing more flexible 
budgets.
Three cantons in Switzerland are run totally by direct 
democracy: Appenzell-ihr, Appenzell-ahr and Obwalden. They range
in size from 13,000 to 240,000 inhabitants and each is politically 
homogeneous. Appenzell-ihr, as pointed out earlier, is the most 
flexible canton with a maximum DBF of 19.00. Appenzell-ahr has a 
maximum DBF of 14.91 and Obwalden of' 14.54. Of the three cantons, 
Appenzell-ihr is the smallest (least complex) and, thus, the most 
flexible; Obwalden is the largest and the least flexible of the three. 
But the idea that direct democracy affects DBF positively is 
supported in Tables 7 and 10. There are no muiticolinarity problems 
with the variable direct democracy and a correlation of .4314 (.0001) 
indicates a strong relationship with DBF. Apparently, if the type of 
government is direct democracy, the demonstrated budgetary flexibility 
increases. Or, where direct democracy exists, DBF will be high. 
Perhaps this indicates that voters do not feel as tied to resource 
allocation rules or historical precedents as do voter representatives. 
Rather, they determine budget priorities based on fluctuating social 
needs.
The regressions in Table 10 verify direct democracy's impact 
on DBF. The short-run direct democracy model explains more of the 
variation in DBF (RSQR = .3330) than does the interparty competition
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model (RSQR = .2340) in Table 9. A conclusion can be made that the 
type of government influences the budget-setting priorities of a 
canton. In this instance, those cantons with representative demo­
cracies have larger populations (more complex environment) and greater 
dependence on the federal government for funds. Therefore, the 
logical expectation is that they would rely more heavily on incre­
mental assumptions than the direct democracies. Incremental 
assumptions as a basis for budget-setting priorities are reflected 
in DBF. If the DBF is low, one expects incremental decisionmaking.
The Swiss study's regression models can bear out this conclusion.
Tables 9 and 10 show that high levels of DBF are associated 
with low levels of environmental complexity or interparty competition 
or fiscal autonomy or high levels of direct democracy. In comparison, 
it can be seen that Table 10 variables constitute a much more potent 
explanation for variations in DBF than do Table 9 variables (RSQR = .3330) 
vs. .2340, respectively). If these relationships are accurate, then 
the long-run analysis should reinforce my conclusions.
Tables 11 and 12 represent the two long-run studies of Swiss 
DBF. Long-run analyses are carried out to eliminate the effects of 
unspecified variables. The regression equations, as done, eliminate 
the need to perform partial correlations; therefore the effects 
noted in Tables 11 and 12 are accurate representations of those 
variables’ impact on intercantonal DBF.
The long-run studies reinforce the theoretical relationships 
of the explanatories to DBF. Environmental complexity or difficulty
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TABLE 11
LONG-RUN REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, 
DBF, AND THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES, ENVIRONMENTAL 
COMPLEXITY, FISCAL AUTONOMY AND INTERPARTY 
COMPETITION
N = 22 
VARIABLES
F Value = 12.699 
B
RSQR = .6791 
BETA STD. ERROR PROB. T
Environmental
Complexity
Fiscal
Autonomy
Interparty
Competition
-1.50
-1.39
0.011
-1.03
-0.63
0.07
24
.41
.02
.0001
.0033
.6241
Oi = .05
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TABLE 12
LONG-RUN REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, 
DBF, AND THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES, ENVIRONMENTAL 
COMPLEXITY, FISCAL AUTONOMY AND DIRECT 
COMPETITION
N = 25 F Value = 37.583 RSQR = .8430
VARIABLES_________________ B____________BETA______ STD. ERROR PROB. T
Environmental
Complexity -1.15 -.88 .22 .0001
Fiscal
Autonomy -1.28 -.42 .34 .0011
Direct
Democracy 1.47 .24 .65 .0363
CK = .05
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of decision-making process, is expected to remain the most useful 
explanatory variable of budget-setting priorities. Fiscal autonomy 
is also expected to remain significant and politics should be weakly 
related to DBF. The one problem--small number of cases--will 
exacerbate the multicolinarity difficulties, but should not harm 
the verification of the short-run results.
Neither model uses local resource availability because of 
the multicolinarity problem between interparty competition and the 
resource variable (-.63589). It is difficult to discern whether 
it's autonomy or wealth that is having an effect on DBF. Some 
wealthy cantons receive higher levels federal assistance than some 
poorer ones. Therefore resource availability was not used in the 
models.
Table 11 represents a repeat of the short-run analysis of 
the interparty competition model. Although there are only twenty- 
two cases for this model, it is useful in showing that the two most 
powerful explanatory variables remain powerful. The multicolinarity 
problem and insufficient number of cases explain the lack of 
statistical significance of interparty competition.
Table 12 portrays the relationship of environmental complexity, 
fiscal autonomy and direct democracy to DBF. It is the most useful 
model, explaining 8 4 -percent (RSQR = .8430) of the variation in DBF. 
Again, the number of cases is under the n required for large group 
statistics, but the significance of the model is not affected.
For environmental complexity, assume that the complexity of
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the environment is determined by the number of demands which 
determine the programs, departments and agencies' services to the 
public. The more programs needed, the more resources were to be 
allocated or reallocated. In Switzerland, this study was unable 
to observe directly the complexity of the environment by counting 
the number of civil servants or federal employees. Because two 
previous studies used population (in some form) as an indicator of 
complexity, I assume that decisionmakers will behave as those did 
in West Germany and Japan and therefore used population as the 
measure of complexity. I expect Swiss decisionmakers to rely on 
standard operating procedures, i.e., incremental rules.
The long-run analysis indicates that environmental complexity 
accounts for 60 percent of the variation in DBF. Fiscal autonomy 
explains 32 percent and direct democracy provides the justification 
for the remaining variation. The entire model explains 84 percent 
of the total variation in DBF. Important to note is that fiscal 
autonomy alone has a weak relationship with DBF (see Table 8:
.09864), but when controlled for effects of other variables in the 
regression model, it is consistently the second most important 
explanation.
Table 14 is the final comparison between Japanese prefectures 
and Swiss cantons. The average DBF for Swiss cantons is 5.80, 
accounting for 14 categories and the total budget. Average Japanese
DBF for 6 categories and the Ordinary Account budget equals 2.79.
5 6Table 14 is the adjusted DBF of Switzerland compared to Japan.
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TABLE 13
LONG- AND SHORT-RUN STATISTICS DESCRIBING 
SWISS CANTONS' AVERAGE DEMONSTRATED 
BUDGETARY FLEXIBILITY
N = 25
MEAN MAXIMUM MINIMUM
Avg. DBF 5.80 10.85 3.54
Adjusted Avg.
DBF
(DBF x 6/14)
2.55 4.77 1.55
N = 275
MEAN MAXIMUM MINIMUM
Avg. DBF 5.80 19.00 1.08
Adjusted Avg.
DBF
(DBF x 6/14)
2.55 8.36 .475
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TABLE 14
COMPARISON OF AVG. DBF OF SWITZERLAND, 
JAPAN AND WEST GERMANY
Avg. DBF
Switzerland 2.55
(N = 25 or 275)
(Adjusted)
Japan 2.79
(N = 46 or 460)
West Germany 5.67
(N = 105)
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The figures in this table indicate that perhaps the Swiss cantons 
are not as flexible as thought to be. Both Japanese prefectures 
and Swiss cantons appear to be extraordinarily stable when compared 
to West German municipalities. West German cities do not labor 
under some form of consensus-seeking decisionmaking procedure; this 
may explain partially the flexibility of West Germany and the 
inflexibility of Switzerland and Japan. Switzerland's consocia- 
tionality mirrors Japan's baransu. The desire to avoid conflict and 
budget stability seem to go hand in hand.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
This study defines the demonstrated budgetary flexibility of 
Swiss cantons. The cantons are relatively stable, with an average 
DBF of 5.80. Several characteristics exist to explain this situation. 
Environmental complexity, fiscal autonomy, interparty competition 
and direct democracy are the explanatory variables describing varia­
tion in DBF. Both short- and long-run regressions and correlations 
support the contention that incremental assumptions are more 
applicable in some cantons than in others.
The analysis of Swiss DBF confirms the results of earlier 
studies, plus addresses the questions of consociationalism, direct 
and representative democracy. Through empirical evidence, this 
analysis proved that Swiss budget priorities remain stable over time 
and across units of government. In comparison to the Japanese and 
West German studies, Swiss cantons tend to be more stable than either 
of these. One explanation for this stability may be the consocia- 
tional environment. The Japanese concept of baransu is similar to 
the Swiss concept of-consociationalism. Switzerland's political 
environment functions under a consensus-oriented atmosphere. Therefore, 
consociationalism may be a contributing factor to DBF.
The desire to achieve consensus makes it logical for cantonal
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governments to rely on incremental assumptions: "satisficing,"
simple allocation rules, and historical precedent. Those cantons 
with representative democracy may depend on these incremental 
assumptions in order to pass a budget each year. The stability of 
the budget could be due to these incremental assumptions.
Several factors are capable of explaining the variation in 
DBF. Of the four variables tested, environmental complexity remained 
the strongest predictor of demonstrated budgetary flexibility in 
both the short- and long-run analyses. The tables presented in 
Chapter IV support this argument that cantons with higher levels of 
environmental complexity tend to demonstrate lower levels of DBF 
than do cantons with lowe levels of environmental complexity.
Of the three remaining variables, fiscal autonomy was the 
second most reliable predictor of DBF. The less dependent a canton 
was on the federal government for monies, the more flexible the 
budget-shares. Interparty competition, as presented in Chapters III 
and IV, showed that political influence on budget-setting priorities 
was present, but minimal. Because of the consociational atmosphere, 
political competition remains low. Parties, as Harold Glass points 
out,57 all have an opportunity to enter the political arena.
Therefore an overwhelming majority for any party is unlikely.
Further, the fact that a "bloc" of parties exists, acting as one 
large party, makes it probable that interparty competition will 
be practically nonexistent. The empirical data supports this 
statement.
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The models in Chapter IV indicate that competition accounts
for only about 6 percent of the variation in demonstrated budgetary 
58flexibility. Given this percentage, interparty competition is
not a powerful explanation of DBF; the studies in West Germany
59did not indicate an overwhelming effect by competition. The 
consociational political situation in Switzerland most probably 
accounts for this result.
The fourth variable-direct democracy--was the third possible 
explanation for DBF variation. This variable was the second political 
variable tested and it produced significant results. In the long- 
run, direct democracy explained 12 percent of the variation in DBF.
The three cantons with direct democracy demonstrated greater budget 
flexibility than the representative democracies. This could signify 
that as the decisionmaking process is more decentralized, priorities 
are fixed by nonincremental assumptions. That is, citizens in 
direct democracies decide budget priorities through program evalua­
tion, rather than reliance on historical precedent or "satisficing.11 
In Switzerland, perhaps, direct democracy removes the need for 
incremental decisionmaking procedures.
In sum, certain settings make it highly likely that incremental 
tools will be used in cantonal budget-setting. High levels of 
environmental complexity or dependence on federal funds or political 
competition yield low levels of DBF--i.e., situations where incremental 
assumptions would be used in determining the budget. Zurich, Berne, 
Lucerne, Geneva, and Uri are all cantons which fulfill one or more
57
of the above criteria and thus have fairly stable budgets. Uri,
for example, had the most inflexible budget-setting priorities of
60
all the cantons. It had an average DBF of 3.32.
The comparative analysis between Japan, West Germany, and 
Switzerland yields some interesting results. Swiss cantons are less 
flexible (2.55) than Japanese prefectures (2.79). But because of 
aggregation, some departments were lumped together. The smaller 
number of Japanese departments means less flexibility and when the 
Swiss budget categories are adjusted for comparison to the Japanese, 
they are also less flexible. In other words, the seven departments 
with close to 50 percent of the budget, retain their 50 percent 
share. This is the fundamental assumption upon which incremental 
theory is based--that departments will maintain their absolute 
share of the budget pie. This absolute inflexibility was not found 
in any of the three studies.
Table 15 represents a comparative analysis of the three 
studies’ explanatory variables. The power of each variable can be 
seen clearly. Environmental complexity in the Swiss investigation 
overwhelmingly explains the majority of the variation in DBF, 
whereas local resource availability is the most powerful explanatory 
in West Germany and Japan.
The questioning of incremental procedures opens the door to 
further research. Decisionmaking in Switzerland has been identified 
as consensus-oriented. Examination of the budget and further testing 
of the theories expounded in Rickards’ West German study could aid in
58
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quantifying the concept of consociationality. Most research and 
literature on consociationalism has not been quantitatively supported. 
Through empirical evidence of consensus in budget-making, proof 
could be found for consociationalism1s existence in Switzerland.
The most useful research would be a thirty-plus year study 
of Swiss DBF. The present analysis is sufficient for testing the 
hypotheses presented in the West German and Japanese analyses, but 
the results could be verified (statistically) better if the time 
period were longer.
Finally, three policy recommendations for budgeting come to 
mind when trying to avoid falling into an incremental "rut.11 First, 
the simplification of the decision-making environment would reduce 
budgetmakers' reliance on incremental tools. In essence, the process 
could be decentralized to the point where each unit must evaluate 
programs and priorities as opposed to reallocating each programs' > 
previous budget. The unit of government itself, should handle the 
analysis on a much more local level. Perhaps giving the legisla­
ture more time, money and staff to adequately analyze the budget 
would provide a stepping stone toward a non-incremental direction.
Second, the evaluation of government programs should be done 
every two to three years. As long as programs exist for extended 
periods of time without checks, the tendancy toward waste and 
undemocratic allocation of finite resources exists. To avoid 
this inefficiency, priorities should be determined in a more non- 
incremental way. There should be less reliance on "satisficing"
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and more on program merit.
Third, the political environment should be modified to 
include a sufficient amount of competition. Competition could be 
encouraged by making more officeholders beholden to the public.
This competition could insure some checks and balances on the budget- 
makers since the legislature must ultimately approve the budget.
If the legislators were more responsive to citizens' desires, 
perhaps the executives would rely less on incremental processes 
than they presently do.
In closing, the top explanatory variables defining variation 
in DBF equal: environmental complexity, fiscal autonomy, interparty
competition/direct democracy. : Although local resource availability 
was a powerful explanatory variable in the other two studies, it was not 
applicable here. As noted in Chapter IV, there was insufficient 
variation in the local resource availability variable to make it 
usable in more than one model. And even in that one model, it was 
not a potent explanation.
The settings where incremental assumptions are most likely 
to occur are: when interparty competition is high or when fiscal
autonomy is high or when environmental complexity is high. These 
conclusions support the results of the West German and Japanese 
analyses indicating that further case studies testing and retesting 
of these assertions would prove helpful in justifying incremental 
theory. By applying his model to another culture and nation, my 
findings have substantiated the empirical validity of the Rickards' 
assumptions.
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of a canton’s budget to its departmental category.
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Ibid.
Ibid.
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Michael Gresalfi, "Japan’s Prefectural Budgetary Process:
An Incremental Analysis" (M.A. thesis: College of William and
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22 Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (Berkeley & Los Angeles: 
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See Chapter II, Section III of this thesis.
24
Gresalfi, Chapter II.
25
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Decision Modes: Intraparty Decision-Making in Switzerland (Chapel
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52This presumes that the legislative branch makes or sets 
budget priorities. If the executive branch is responsible for 
budget-setting, and the legislative branch merely approves, then 
voter influence is felt minimally. In Japan, the MOF with input by 
the LDP, determines budget priorities. In Switzerland, each canton 
is responsible at the local level for setting priorities.
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"^The models were tried with local resource availability as 
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■^Glass, introduction.
58The short-run model has the variables environmental 
complexity, fiscal autonomy, local resource availability and 
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